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China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and promotion of BRI investments in more than 60 countries 
along the ancient territorial and maritime 'Silk Roads' may give rise to (1) trade disputes and WTO 
dispute settlement procedures; (2) investment disputes settled through China's more than 130 BITs, 
ICSID or UNICITRAL arbitration proceedings; (3) financial disputes settled through bilateral 
negotiations, arbitration courts and other jurisdictions in China rather than through multilateral treaty 
institutions like the Asian IIB; (4) intellectual property disputes settled through Chinese jurisdictions 
(like China's Patent office and Chinese courts) or through WTO, WIPO and other multilateral dispute 
settlement procedures; (5) commercial disputes settled through Chinese courts and commercial 
arbitration procedures, subject to various limitations of the legal admissibility of ad hoc arbitration inside 
China; as regards (6) maritime disputes, China refused participating in the UNCLOS arbitration initiated 
by the Philippines and rejected the UNCLOS arbitration award of 2016 concerning the South China Sea; 
as regards (7) energy trade and investment disputes, China has not yet ratified the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT) providing for international state-state and investor-state arbitration. Avoidance of multilateral 
treaties and lack of a multilateral dispute settlement approach distinguish the BRI from past US 
leadership for multilateral dispute settlement systems in GATT, ICSID, the WTO and regional FTAs. 
This contribution discusses the increasing 'systemic rivalry' among authoritarian, neo-liberal and ordo-
liberal conceptions of international economic law and the resulting legal problems in the settlement of 
BRI disputes inside EU countries, whose courts may not recognize arbitration awards by Chinese 
arbitration institutions and may hold Chinese investors accountable for disregard for human and labor 
rights in their BRI investment inside EU countries. 
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Introduction: Multilevel governance of transnational public goods connecting East and 
West* 
All human societies use law as an instrument for social ordering. Yet, even though homo sapiens seems 
to have evolved in Africa, legal civilizations emerged in the villages, cities, kingdoms and empires in 
Asia, Europe and around the Mediterranean Sea thousands of years ago. Up to the 19th century, the 
economies of China and India were as important as those of European empires. The scientific revolutions 
since the 16th century, and the industrial and legal revolutions since the 18th century, enabled the 
industrialized countries in Western Europe and North America to dominate international economic 
relations and their legal regulation during the 19th and 20th centuries. Following World War II, almost 
all Asian trading nations joined the GATT/WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions; they used these 
multilateral legal and dispute settlement systems for reforming their national and regional economic, 
trading and legal systems in Asia, thereby lifting more than a billion of poor people in China, India and 
other Asian countries out of poverty. While Western countries continue to dominate the legal design of 
worldwide economic organizations like the 1994 World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 1944 
Bretton Woods institutions, Asian countries became locomotives driving economic growth not only for 
their own populations but providing goods and services also for people all over the world. Many Western 
industrialized countries continue struggling with the economic, social and political adjustment problems 
resulting from Asia regaining its major share in the world economy, as the shares and political influence 
of North America and Europe relatively shrink in the 21st century. The hegemonic assault by the US 
Trump administration on multilateral trade and environmental agreements since 2017 (cf. Petersmann 
2018a), the emergence of China as the biggest trading nation with - soon – the world’s largest economy, 
and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013 for strengthening trade, 
investment and infrastructure cooperation with 65 Asian, African and European countries along the 
ancient territorial and maritime Silk Roads, are historical turning points in designing economic, legal 
and political cooperation between East and West. While the US Trump administration’s bilateral “trade 
wars” (e.g. against China) reflect US attempts at maintaining economic, technological and military US 
hegemony, Europe emphasizes its different strategic self-interest in maintaining and adjusting 
multilateral trade and investment systems as legal basis for mutually beneficial cooperation with Asia.  
During most of its history of more than 5’000 years, China perceived itself as the “Middle Kingdom” 
maintaining “suzerain-vassal” relationships with several of its neighbouring countries. Law played only 
a secondary role in Chinese society due to the primary importance given to feudal hierarchies, social 
stratification, and traditional family and kinship systems. The two intellectual Chinese traditions of 
Confucianism and legalism contributed to the imperial administration’s increasing use of “rule by 
administrative decrees”; yet, even though “humane governance” and promotion of social welfare were 
accepted as moral responsibilities of Chinese rulers and as parts of their “mandate from heaven”, little 
attention was given to individual rights; litigation was discouraged, and “rule of law” in the substantive 
sense of independent judicial protection of individual rights against abuses of state powers was hardly 
known (cf. Carty/Nijman 2018). The late Qing government’s isolation policy in the 18th century 
contributed to China’s fall under the rule of imperial powers. The communist revolution during Mao 
Zedong’s era (1949-1978) led to impoverishing economic policies and ‘social dis-embedding’ (e.g. due 
to food crises and the ‘cultural revolution’). The reforms and “open door policies” under Deng 
Xiaoping’s rule (1979-1989) introduced a “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” and 
economics-driven legal reforms ushering in China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. China’s government 
 
* E.U.Petersmann is emeritus Professor of International and European law, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. 
ulrich.petersmann@eui.eu. Former legal adviser in the German Ministry of Economics, GATT and the WTO; former 
secretary, member of chairman of GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels; and former representative of Germany in 
many EU, UN and other international institutions. This contribution will be published in: G.Martinico/Wu Xueyan (eds), 
A Legal Analysis of The Belt and Road Initiative: Towards a New Silk Road? Palgrave MacMillan Publishers 2020. 
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used WTO law also for introducing judicial reforms and for embedding its “one state, two systems” 
policies into international law, for instance by accepting four WTO memberships of China, Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan (cf. Wu, 2012). The BRI continues to be primarily motivated by domestic policy 
goals (e.g. to improve access to resources and export markets); it can be viewed as the ‘third opening’ 
of China’s liberalization policies beginning in 1978 and embedded into multilateral WTO market access 
commitments since 2001. Yet, whereas democratic and republican city states (e.g. in ancient Greece, 
Italy, Germany and other northern European states belonging to the “Hanseatic League”) and their 
“constitutional checks and balances” protected decentralized, competitive legal structures promoting 
free and prosperous societies in many parts of Europe (cf. Scheidel 2019)1, there are no signs of China’s 
totalitarian “communist party state” accepting constitutionalism and legal decentralization as reasonable 
self-restraints protecting citizens against abuses of political power. Nor is China transforming its “one 
state, two systems” agreements into a constitutional confederation protecting human and constitutional 
rights of citizens in all four Chinese customs territories.   
According to K.Mahbubani, Singapore’s long-time ambassador to the United Nations (UN), the “biggest 
gift the West gave the Rest was the power of reasoning”, which “seeped into Asian minds gradually, 
through the adoption of Western science and technology and the application of the scientific method to 
solving social problems” (Mahbubani 2018:11ff): 
“East Asian societies, especially Japan and the ‘Four Tigers’ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) were the first to absorb these ideas and practices, such as free market economics and 
empirical scientific research”…. “This spread of Western reasoning … triggered three silent 
revolutions that explain the extraordinary success of many non-Western societies in recent 
decades”…. “The first revolution is political. For millenia, Asian societies were deeply feudal. The 
people were accountable to their rulers, not rulers to their people. ‘Oriental despotism’ was a fair 
description of the political environments in all corners of Asia”… “The rebellion against all kinds 
of feudal mind-sets which gained momentum in the second half of the twentieth century was hugely 
liberating for all Asian societies”… “in a big shift from previous ‘despotic’ assumptions, most Asian 
leaders now recognized that they are accountable to their people”…. “The second revolution is 
psychological: the Rest are going from believing that they were helpless voyagers in a life 
determined by ‘fate’ to believing that they can take control of their lives and rationally produce 
better outcomes”… “In the last thirty years, we have carried more people over the threshold of 
university education than we have in the previous 3’000 years”… “The third revolution is in the 
field of governance”... “Fifty years ago, few Asian governments believed that good rational 
governance could transform their societies. Now most do”…. “In China, India and Indonesia, more 
than 90 per cent of young people named technology as the factor that made them most hopeful for 
the future”. 
Decolonization, universal recognition of human rights, and multilevel governance of public goods (PGs) 
through national and international organizations are among the biggest political achievements during 
the second half of the 20th century. The shift of power to Asia has, however, failed to effectively protect 
human rights and multilevel, democratic governance of PGs in many Asian countries. Globalization 
continues to transform most national into transnational PGs like rule of law, rules-based trading 
systems, protection of the environment, mitigation of climate change, and protection of many of the 17 
“sustainable development goals” (SDGs) adopted by all UN member states. Yet, the collective action 
problems require limitations of intergovernmental power politics through “constitutionalization” of 
discretionary foreign policies aimed at transforming national into multilevel governance of 
transnational PGs for the benefit of citizens. Such multilevel constitutionalism continues being resisted 
by many governments (cf. Petersmann, 2020a), often due to feudal, religious and other power-oriented 
- rather than humanist and democratic - world views neglecting the close interrelationships between 
 
1 Scheidel (2019) explains the widening economic gap between Europe after the fall of the Roman empire and other parts of 
the Old World in terms of (1) Europe’s legal decentralization (unleashing “competitive fragmentation of power”, economic 
rivalries, growth and “renaissance modernity” in many parts of Europe) and (2) the later industrial revolutions as the two 
“great divergences” differentiating Europe from the “agrarian paternalism” in China.  
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transnational economic and non-economic “overlapping PGs” (e.g. between a rules-based world trading 
system, climate change mitigation, and the 17 SDGs). The US Trump administration’s assault on the 
WTO legal and dispute settlement system risks undermining protection also of many non-economic 
PGs. Will China’s BRI and bilateral agreements with more than 60 countries participating in trade, 
investment and infrastructure cooperation along the territorial and maritime Silk Roads offer Asian 
leadership for rules-based protection of transnational PGs and peaceful settlement of related trade and 
investment disputes? This contribution discusses some of the related legal questions by using the 
example of disputes over “silk road projects” financed and operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in European states, where Chinese SOEs bought and administer parts of the Piraeus harbour in 
Athens (Greece), construct a railway linking Belgrade (Serbia) to Budapest in Hungary, and improve 
China’s “Silk Road connections” with Europe through numerous other investments. This BRI 
cooperation with 17 central, eastern and southern European countries is coordinated through annual 
“17+1” Ministerial meetings and a secretariat in Beijing (with “national coordinators” in each of the 17 
partner countries). Yet, also this BRI cooperation is not treaty-based due to China’s preference for legal 
flexibility and administrative discretion. 
Can China’s bilateralism be reconciled with the EU’s multilateral approaches to 
international law? 
National legal traditions in Asian countries differ from democratic constitutionalism (e.g. in ancient 
Athens) and republican constitutionalism (e.g.in ancient Rome), which continue to shape the national 
and European legal systems in the 27 constitutional democracies of the European Union (EU). The 
ancient constitutional theories of justice (as expressed in the publications of Greek and Roman 
philosophers like Plato, Aristotle and Cicero) justifying law, republican governance, rules-based self-
regulation in “private law societies”, constitutional “checks and balances” and judicial remedies by 
procedural, constitutional, distributive, corrective, commutative justice principles and equity have no 
equivalent in Chinese legal traditions. Nor does the transformation of agreed principles of justice in 
national and European constitutional law systems – such as the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR) recognizing civil, political, economic and social, human and constitutional rights of EU 
citizens as multilevel, constitutional restraints on the legislative, executive and judicial powers of EU 
institutions – have a parallel in the legal system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Citizens are 
not allowed to invoke China’s national Constitution in Chinese courts as a basis for individual rights. 
The basic principles of democratic constitutionalism – like free democratic elections of representative 
national and European parliaments, and independent, multilevel judicial protection of human and 
constitutional rights of citizens against abuses of executive and legislative powers – remain alien to the 
totalitarian claim of China’s communist party (CCP) to unlimited political powers over state institutions 
and private citizens (cf. Li & Jiang 2018; Petersmann 2018b). The recognition of “inalienable” and 
“indivisible” civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights in UN law and EU constitutional 
law, and their effective domestic protection inside the national legal systems of EU member states, 
reflect regulatory approaches to the complex interactions between civil societies and their 
interdependent legal, political, economic, social and cultural systems, which are fundamentally different 
from the PRC’s regulatory approaches (e.g. vis-à-vis minoritarian Tibetan and Uighur cultures, political 
dissidents, human rights advocates, economic competition, political, social and labour rights). The 
different legal cultures risk provoking conflicts if, for example, Chinese SOEs implementing “Silk Road 
projects” inside the EU (like construction of transport links) fail to respect human, labour, environmental 
or judicial rights protecting workers and citizens inside EU member states; or when foreign direct 
investors from the EU are denied “access to justice” in Chinese jurisdictions and are forced to accept 
the formation of “CCP committees” also inside foreign firms operating in China. 
Such risks of conflicts among diverse national legal systems are amplified by the fact that important UN 
conventions (e.g. on civil, political and labour rights) and international dispute settlement jurisdictions 
(e.g. by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea) ratified by EU member states have not been 
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accepted by China. The EU proposals for creating multilateral investment court systems have, so far, 
also not been supported by China; yet, at an informal meeting of WTO trade ministers on 24 January 
2020 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, China was among 43 WTO members committing 
themselves to using Article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) for an interim 
appellate arbitration review pending the resolution of the WTO Appellate Body (AB) crisis triggered by 
the US blocking of AB nominations. The implementation of the BRI reflects preferences of Chinese 
authorities and SOEs for informal bilateralism (e.g. based on “memoranda of understandings”), 
avoidance of multilateral treaties, and settlement of disputes by political negotiations or mediation and 
arbitration proceedings inside China rather than by international adjudication.2 The protection standards 
and dispute settlement provisions in China’s bilateral investment treaties do not follow a uniform 
pattern; they have, so far, rarely been invoked by Chinese or foreign companies (cf. Shan 2015 and 
2020; Chaisse 2019). China’s “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” differs 
fundamentally from the multilevel constitutional design of the EU’s “competitive social market 
economy” (Article 3 Lisbon Treaty). For example: 
• The risks of domestic market distortions resulting from the totalitarian control by the CCP of state 
bodies, other public bodies (like thousands of SOEs) and private bodies (including also thousands 
of private companies) are not effectively limited by multilevel competition laws, policies and 
judicial remedies similar to those inside the EU.3 
• The risks of public and private distortions of WTO market access commitments aimed at non-
discriminatory conditions of trade, undistorted price competition, reciprocity and transnational 
rule of law are not effectively limited by “common market law” (e.g. similar to EU common 
market rights, judicial remedies, and constitutional “checks and balances”) and reciprocal opening 
of market access (e.g. to government procurement). 
• The gigantic size of China’s domestic market (18% of the world population), its totalitarian control 
and direction (e.g. through direct and indirect subsidization of SOEs), and inadequate protection 
of intellectual property have entailed structural over-production (e.g. of steel, cement, aluminium, 
solar panels) and counterfeiting, with exportation of surplus products and of counterfeited goods 
causing major disruptions in third countries (e.g. more than 80% of all counterfeit and pirated 
products seized in 2013 in seven EU countries originated in China). Chinese restrictions of internet 
governance, distortions of the digital economy, and political uses of digital control technologies 
prompt technological rivalries and conflicts between Chinese and foreign interests (e.g. over 
technology transfers imposed on foreign companies, 5G network technologies). 
• China’s export-oriented trade mercantilism has entailed “one-way traffic” on the railways 
connecting China with Europe, with many trains returning empty to China. 
• China’s claims to unilateral appropriation of more than 80% of the South China Sea – in violation 
of its multilateral legal obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
as formally established through legally binding arbitration awards4 - reveal hegemonic ambitions 
in China’s maritime “Silk Roads” policies. 
 
2 On the dispute resolution culture in East Asia, its preferred use of arbitration and mediation, and the advantages of using 
commercial arbitration for the settlement of disputes over BRI investments rather than the Chinese ordinary, judicial 
system, see: Yuhong Chai (2018). Many of the 51 WTO members along the Belt and Road are less developed countries 
with comparatively less developed judicial systems and hardly any effective, regional court systems outside Europe. 
3 Cf. “China grants immunity to executives to bolster private sector” (Financial Times of 15 December 2019, reporting that 
“Chinese prosecutors are dropping criminal charges against business owners in a desperate effort to rescue the country’s 
ailing private sector” so as to “help companies grappling with one of the country’s worst debt crises”, thereby “putting the 
economy above the strict implementation of the law”).   
4 See China’s rejection of the arbitration award of 12 July 2016 under UNCLOS Annex VII concerning the Chinese 
claims to control more than 80 per cent of the South China Sea without regard to UNCLOS obligations: 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Case No 2013-19 in the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration (The 
International settlement of trade and investment disputes over Chinese ‘silk road projects’  
Inside the European Union 
European University Institute 5 
• China’s strategy of low wages and of denial of labour and trade union rights has prompted China 
to ratify only 26 of the 177 International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions (e.g. refusing to 
ratify the ILO Conventions on forced labour, freedom of association, and the right to collective 
bargaining, and disregarding recommendations made by ILO monitoring committees).  
 
Mutually beneficial trade and investment cooperation for creating transnational infrastructures of 
(rail)road, maritime and internet connectivity among countries along the Silk Roads meets the criteria 
of ‘aggregate PGs’.5 Whereas informal bilateralism may entail abuses of power asymmetries imposing 
superior interests of the stronger partner, rules-based and transparent multilateralism protects weaker 
countries against abuses of power. US governments have taken an antagonistic view of the BRI in view 
of their strategic rivalries with China. The EU’s multilateralism pursues no hegemonic foreign policies. 
At a 2017 BRI Forum in China, EU delegates surprised their Chinese hosts by turning down an offer to 
sign a declaration supporting the BRI by financing infrastructure investments inside the EU. Even 
though the EU describes China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance”, it has 
not opposed the participation of EU member states in various BRI projects financed by Chinese SOEs, 
notably in Southern, Central and Eastern European states. Europeans criticize BRI governance, inter 
alia, for lack of transparency, reciprocity, and of respect for competition, environmental, labor and 
human rights standards by Chinese SOEs. At another BRI Forum in April 2019, President Xi Jinping 
pledged a more open approach and – in response to problems of over-indebtedness of some borrowing 
countries - respect for financial sustainability. The more the US Trump administration rejects 
multilateral agreements in favor of unilateral power politics and ‘bilateral deals’ undermining the WTO 
and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change prevention, the more obvious become the increasing 
conflicts between three different, geopolitical policy paradigms: 
• US leadership for multilateral, neo-liberal trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization of 
economic activities since World War II continues to be driven by domestic interest group politics, 
resulting in increasing social inequalities inside the USA and in US non-participation in important 
worldwide agreements (like UNCLOS, many multilateral human rights treaties, criminal law 
treaties, and environmental treaties). The underlying economics is based more on utilitarian 
“Chicago school” reasoning (e.g. market-driven maximization of “Pareto-“ and “Kaldor-Hicks-
efficiencies”) than on “constitutional economics” (e.g. increasing economic and social welfare 
through democratic regulation of “market failures” and related “governance failures” in order to 
better satisfy general preferences of consumers and citizens). Neo-liberal US leadership has ended 
with President Trump’s mercantilist power politics shunning legal constraints in both domestic 
and foreign policies. The Trump administration’s external mercantilism and domestic neo-
liberalism disdain ‘judicialization’ of dispute settlements in worldwide agreements (like the 
WTO), notably in view of their judicial limitations of US abuses of trade remedy laws.  
• China’s totalitarian state capitalism denies effective legal constraints on the CCP’s political 
monopoly and economic dirigisme; notwithstanding China’s continuing support for multilateral 
WTO negotiations and WTO dispute settlement procedures, China prefers administrative 
 
Republic of the Philippines v The Peoples Republic of China). The award is published on the PCA website at 
www.pcacases.com/web/view/7. 
5 On the defining characteristics and different kinds of “pure PGs” (whose use is ‘non-rival’ and ‘non-excludable’ 
like human rights) and “impure PGs” (like ‘club goods’ excluding free-riders, common pool resources with 
rival uses), the related “collective action problems”, and their limitation through “multilevel constitutionalism” 
and multilevel governance institutions see Petersmann (2017) ch 2; Shi (2018). As “market failures” (like free-
riding) impede the decentralized provision of PGs, and the “aggregation” and transformation of national PGs 
into transnational PGs (like transnational rule of law, climate change mitigation) is made difficult by collective 
action problems among self-interested state actors with different preferences and interests, there is no universal 
solution or strategy for “republican governance”, i.e. the “building blocks” and production processes for 
transnational PGs may differ depending on the particular regulatory challenges.   
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discretion and legal flexibility in bilateral BRI cooperation, thereby enabling China to use power 
asymmetries to its advantage (e.g. in the South China Sea). 
• European ordo-liberalism rejects neo-liberal “market fundamentalism” advocating for a minimal 
state; it emphasizes the need for “strong states” legally limiting “market failures”, “governance 
failures” and “constitutional failures” (cf. Petersmann 1983; Slobodian 2018). The EU’s ordo-
liberal “economic constitutionalism” uses multilateral treaty disciplines for limiting market 
failures and governance failures also in multilevel governance of transnational PGs and 
international dispute settlement through rules-based trade and investment liberalization, 
adjudication, protection of the environment and of human and constitutional rights as foundations 
of the EU’s “competitive social market economy”. Reconciling European multilateralism with 
Chinese bilateralism will require multilateral, rules-based approaches to protecting transnational 
rule of law and respect for human rights, as prescribed in the EU’s foreign policy constitution (cf. 
Petersmann 2020a). 
Trade and investment disputes between China and the EU 
BRI projects financed and carried out by Chinese companies continue to be based on flexible legal 
instruments (like memoranda of understandings) that tend to avoid multilateral BRI treaties and 
institutions.6 China’s BRI projects are often based on informal, bilateral and state-centered practices 
compared with the US post-war leadership for the multilateral Bretton-Woods Agreements, GATT, the 
WTO and multilateral trade adjudication. China has been a party to the World Bank Agreement 
establishing the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for more than 
25 years; it has also complied with most adverse WTO dispute settlement rulings (cf. Zhou 2019). These 
ICSID and WTO dispute settlement procedures are also available for the settlement of trade and 
investment disputes linked to BRI projects. Yet, China’s BRI dispute settlement strategy has prioritized 
commercial arbitration in China’s International Commercial Court (CICC) of the Supreme People’s 
Court (cf. Jiang 2020), other Chinese arbitration institutions like the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and its Silk Road Arbitration Center in Xi’an, and 
cooperation with other arbitration centers in Asia (e.g. in Hong Kong, Singapore), Africa and Europe 
(cf. Gu 2020). The lack of a multilateral dispute settlement strategy distinguishes the BRI from the past 
US leadership for multilateral dispute settlement systems in GATT, ICSID, the WTO and regional free 
trade agreements (FTAs). Instead, China follows diverse, complementary dispute settlement methods 
and emphasizes the advantages of political dispute settlement methods over third party adjudication.  
At least 7 different kinds of BRI disputes should be distinguished; their often “overlapping jurisdictions” 
may lead to “strategic forum shopping”: 
• International trade disputes tend to be settled by China through multilateral WTO dispute 
settlement procedures or through bilateral and regional negotiations. The 2010 ASEAN-China 
FTA (as amended in 2018) provides for settlement of disputes through consultations, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration. 
• Investment disputes tend to be settled through bilateral negotiations in the context of China’s more 
than 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) rather than through the very small number, so far, of 
ICSID or UNICITRAL arbitration proceedings involving the PRC or companies from the PRC. 
• Financial disputes seem to be settled through bilateral negotiations, arbitration and other 
jurisdictions in China rather than through multilateral treaty institutions like the AIIB, which 
provides for settlement of disputes concerning loans from this bank through UNCITRAL 
arbitration. 
 
6 The 2015 Agreement establishing the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 2001 Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization – even though initiated by China and having their headquarters at Beijing – have mandates far beyond BRI 
cooperation.  
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• Intellectual property disputes may be settled through Chinese jurisdictions (like China’s Patent 
Office and Chinese courts) or through WTO, WIPO and other multilateral dispute settlement 
procedures. 
• Commercial disputes are settled through Chinese courts and commercial arbitration procedures, 
subject to various limitations of the legal admissibility of ad hoc arbitration inside China (e.g. 
private ad hoc arbitration may be allowed inside China only inside Free Trade Zones and certain 
arbitration centers). 
• As regards maritime disputes, China refused participating in the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
procedures initiated by the Philippines and rejected the UNCLOS arbitration award of 2016 
concerning the South China Sea. 
• As regards energy trade and investment disputes, China is not among the more than 75 members 
of the 1998 Energy Charter Treaty, which provides for international state-state and investor-state 
arbitration (ISA) of energy disputes and related investments. 
This potential diversity of BRI disputes seems to confirm that creating a single dispute settlement 
mechanism for settling all potential BRI disputes would be neither feasible nor desirable. Yet, the 
pragmatic ‘trial and error’ approach of China vis-à-vis dispute settlement of BRI projects may be 
insufficient, for instance regarding countries that are not WTO members, with which China has not 
concluded a BIT or an FTA, or whose domestic judicial systems for the settlement of economic disputes 
are not reliable (e.g. due to lack of rule of law, of judicial independence, lack of trade law and financial 
law traditions, or concerns about the enforcement of arbitral awards).7 The diversity of dispute 
settlement fora for BRI related disputes invites “forum shopping”, for instance in case of disputes over 
intellectual property rights protected by WIPO conventions, the WTO Agreement on trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS), and international investment law. So far, China seems to have 
initiated hardly any WTO disputes and investment arbitration disputes related to Silk Road projects. If 
borrowing and host countries asked for adjustments to Silk Road Projects (like Malaysia due to its 
financial difficulties to pay its debts vis-à-vis China), political dispute settlements and contract re-
negotiations were the preferred methods of agreed dispute settlement. Like China, also many other Asian 
countries often prefer political rather than judicial dispute settlement methods (as illustrated by the 
rejection of ICSID by India, Thailand and Vietnam). The disregard for the WTO legal obligation (under 
Article IX:1 WTO Agreement) to appoint vacant WTO AB positions by majority votes, if necessary, 
illustrates that some WTO members may not be unhappy about the US initiative to destroy the WTO 
AB review system, which – as of 11 December 2019 – is no longer capable of accepting new appeals or 
completing all the 13 pending appellate review procedures. The draft Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement between China and 14 other Asian countries, which is 
scheduled to be finalized in 2020, does not provide for a regional judicial and appellate review system 
that could compensate for the likely breakdown of the international rule of law at the worldwide level 
of WTO governance. 
The prioritization of bilaterally agreed, political dispute settlements has also become characteristic for 
the EU’s external trade, investment and economic cooperation agreements. In EU treaty practices, 
disputes tend to be settled in bilateral treaty committees; treaty provisions for international arbitration 
have, so far, been rarely invoked by the EU (e.g. recently for the settlement of disputes over Korea’s 
compliance with rules on worker rights in the EU-Korea FTA). This preference of both China and the 
EU for settling international financial and investment disputes politically stands in sharp contrast to the 
legalization and judicialization of trade, investment and financial disputes inside the EU. The Achmea 
 
7 On the risks of non-enforcement of arbitral awards in Asian BRI countries (e.g. due to invocation of the “public policy 
exception” in Article V:2,b of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards), 
and on the advantages of harmonizing the “public policy concept” in the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards among 
Asian countries, see: Weixia Gu (2018).   
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judgment of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) of March 20188 on the inconsistency of BITs among EU 
member states with EU constitutional law and its judicial remedies entails that - according to the EU 
Commission – “all investor-State arbitration clauses in intra-EU BITs are inapplicable and that any 
arbitration tribunal established on the basis of such clauses lacks jurisdiction due to the absence of a 
valid arbitration agreement”.9 In a Declaration of 15 January 2018 on the legal consequences of the 
Achmea judgment and on investment protection, 22 EU member states committed to terminate their – 
altogether more about 80 - intra-EU BITs by December 2019, if possible; they will no longer interpret 
the Energy Charter Treaty as including ISA clauses applicable in relations among EU member states.10 
Some of the EU’s constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and economic freedoms also protect 
Chinese investors and workers inside the EU. For instance, according to Article 15:3 EUCFR, 
“(n)ationals of third countries who are authorized to work in the territories of the Member States are 
entitled to working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union”. Article 17:1 EUCFR 
provides: 
“Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired 
possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in 
the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in 
good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for 
the general interest.” 
Hence, EU fundamental rights may be relied upon to ensure adequate protection also of Chinese 
investors and of their workers carrying out Silk Road projects inside EU member states. Past 
infringement actions by the EU Commission underscore its willingness to act on its own to protect 
foreign investors inside EU member states from measures taken by their host states, rather than leave it 
only to those investors to seek judicial remedies.11 The jurisprudence of the CJEU continues clarifying 
investor protection under EU law by member state courts in the wake of the Achmea Judgment. This 
may incentivize also foreign investors, or their workers, to seek damages in host country courts for 
failures to comply with investment protection obligations and fundamental rights under EU law. In such 
disputes related to Silk Road investment projects inside EU member states, national and European courts 
– and, if the aim of concluding an EU-China BIT by the end of 2020 should be realized, possibly also 
ISA composed of professional judges – will be legally bound to apply European fundamental rights and 
constitutional law as parts of the applicable law. As the demands of justice, and of legal and judicial 
justification, may differ according to the particular contexts, the principles of justice applicable to market 
and business transactions, labor contracts, “justice at the workplace”, and “just compensation” for direct 
or indirect expropriation of property rights in EU-China relations may differ from those developed by 
national and European courts for foreign investments by EU citizens among EU member states. Yet, 
human rights (including human rights at work and to own private property) – as a type of fundamental 
rights focusing on respect for everyone’s dignity and humanity – are recognized as “general principles 
of the Union’s law” (cf. Article 6 Lisbon TEU) that protect Chinese workers and investors inside the 
EU no less than workers and investors with EU passports. EU human rights law, constitutional law and 
social legislation tend to limit “market failures” and “governance failures” (e.g. public and private 
abuses of power like gender, racial and other discrimination, forced labor, child labor, other abuses of 
power in the workplace) much more strictly than in authoritarian Asian countries, which protect much 
 
8 Case C-284/16, The Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, 6 March 2018. 
9 Cf. Protection of Intra-EU Investment, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
COM (2018) 547 (19/7/2018), at p. 26. 
10 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en. 
11 Cf. the judgment in Commission v Hungary, Case C 235/17 (May 21, 2019). See also COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL Protection of intra-EU investment, 
COM/2018/547 final (Brussels: European Commission, 2018) (providing “guidance to help EU investors to invoke their 
rights before national administrations and courts and to help Member States to protect the public interest in compliance 
with EU law.”) 
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lower minimum standards of welfare and well-being  (e.g. in terms of legal prohibition of gender and 
racial discrimination and other abuses of power). As Chinese SOEs may not be used to respecting civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights and the ordo-liberal competition and social laws in social 
market economies, their implementation of Silk Road projects inside EU member states may give rise 
to legal conflicts (e.g. about “justice at work” in the power relationships between Chinese employers 
and their employees inside EU member states if liberal values like equal individual freedoms, privacy 
and co-determination of workers are disregarded); the settlement of such conflicts inside the EU may 
entail judicial dispute settlement procedures different from ISA, mediation and conciliation. It remains 
to be seen whether the ongoing negotiations on reforms of ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration 
procedures, and the EU proposals for a multilateral investment court system, will strengthen the public 
law dimensions of investor-state disputes in ways that will also be accepted by China; or whether the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU and of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on protecting human 
rights as worker rights (e.g. based on EU anti-discrimination law, Articles 8, 11 and 14 European 
Convention on Human Rights) will strengthen the legal disciplines for foreign investors inside the EU 
and the protection of their workers (e.g. against being treated like commodities or robots), for instance 
by limiting the terms of labor contracts through mandatory principles of constitutional law and human 
rights law aimed at guaranteeing “justice at work for all” (cf. Collins 2019).   
Conclusion: Multilevel protection of rule of law in silk road investment projects? 
International trade, competition, investment, social and environmental laws need new rules in order to 
better take into account the risks of market failures and governance failures (including climate change) 
in relations between neo-liberal economies (e.g. in Africa, the Americas and Asia), state-capitalist 
economies (e.g. in China and many of its Asian BRI partner countries), and ordo-liberal economies (e.g. 
in Europe). The more globalization transforms national into transnational PGs (like transnational 
connectivity among BRI countries, climate stability) which no state can unilaterally protect without 
international law and cooperation, the more multilevel governance of transnational PGs requires 
multilevel protection of transnational rule of law; also the legitimacy of economic, financial and 
investment cooperation in the implementation of BRI projects depends on rules-based legal frameworks, 
impartial dispute settlement procedures, predictability and compliance of governance with the “rule of 
law” as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, … including the State 
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards” that have 
become part of universally recognized human rights principles.12 
The trade wars between China and the USA since 2018 were caused by (1) geopolitical rivalries and 
mercantilist zero-sum-conceptions of international trade advocated by the US Trump administration; (2) 
American neo-liberal interest-group politics (e.g. increasing recourse to illegal “trade remedies” and US 
disruption of the WTO dispute settlement system); and (3) systemic conflicts between China’s 
totalitarian state-capitalism and liberal interpretations of WTO law (Petersmann 2020b). The “phase-
one economic and trade agreement between China and the USA”, signed on 15 January 2020, reflects 
these systemic conflicts: while the Preamble acknowledges that it is “in the interest of both countries 
that trade grow”, the agreement leaves – arguably WTO-inconsistent, illegal – discriminatory US tariffs 
on imports from China worth up to $360bn in place; it includes discriminatory commitments of China 
to increase its purchases of  US goods and services up to a total amount of $200 bn during 2020/2021, 
thereby strengthening China’s state-capitalist quantitative trade management; other agreed provisions 
(e.g. on “forced” technology transfer, currency manipulation) aim at rules-based market-opening and at 
legal disciplines limiting market distortions in China, without mentioning discriminatory US restrictions 
on Chinese technology firms like Huawei; the bilateral dispute settlement procedure provides for the 
possibility of unilateral, discriminatory trade sanctions inconsistent with WTO rules and WTO dispute 
 
12 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/97 (2012) on “The Rule of Law at National and International Levels”.    
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settlement procedures. The incoherent character of this partial “trade truce” is also illustrated by the 
absence of rules on many of the systemic US complaints of Chinese trade distortions (e.g. by industrial 
subsidies, SOEs, China’s technology policies and cyber theft); the hegemonic, geopolitical rivalries 
underlying this “phase-one truce” suggest that the US trade war risks continuing indefinitely. Similarly, 
the agreement announced by the USA, the EU and Japan in January 2020 on tougher subsidy disciplines 
aimed at Chinese SOEs remains unenforceable due to the simultaneous US disruption of the WTO legal 
and dispute settlement system.13 Continuing trade conflicts appear unavoidable not only between 
China’s totalitarian state capitalism (e.g. denying constitutional “checks and balances” limiting the 
CCP’s powers and state-interventions) and the interest-group-driven, American neo-liberalism, where 
economic and environmental law-making are dominated by rent-seeking interest groups and by their 
financial support for congressmen and trade politicians; as illustrated by the US sanctions against 
Chinese technology companies, the US trade war against China and the increasing use by the USA of 
trade sanctions as a foreign policy instrument also affect third countries and the future of the WTO.  
Following the 2016 “Brexit referendum” and the US election of President Trump, the executive trade 
policies of both the British and US governments increasingly avoided multilateral legal disciplines, 
parliamentary and judicial control also in relations with European trading partners (cf. Petersmann 
2020b); this increasing recourse to intergovernmentalism and power-related conflicts (e.g. between EU 
law and Anglo-Saxon deregulation of product, production, tax, competition and environmental 
standards) is likely to further undermine multilateral trade rules and adjudication. Other WTO member 
countries increasingly emulate the US tactics of preventing judicial clarifications of WTO rules. For 
example, a draft WTO panel report of spring 2019 on China’s complaint against EU anti-dumping 
measures found that Section 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol does not prevent other WTO 
members from applying non-discriminatory “distortion of competition principles” in their application 
of anti-dumping laws to imports from China; China’s suspension of this WTO complaint after the 
interim review of the panel findings ushered in the non-publication and non-adoption of this panel report 
and of its important clarification of WTO legal disciplines. As China refused to accept the OECD 
principles on artificial intelligence, and its “Made in China 2025” program aims at import substitution 
and technological independence (e.g. replacing foreign by domestic computers in all government 
offices), EU countries have introduced stricter surveillance of foreign direct investments from China 
(notably in information and communication technology sectors). Many WTO members continue to 
criticize China for not adequately meeting its transparency requirements under WTO law (e.g. regarding 
subsidies, sub-central government measures, China’s obligation to translate its regulations into English). 
The more the US assault on the WTO legal and dispute settlement system limits political and judicial 
clarifications of the often contested meaning of WTO rights and obligations, the more China may find 
it preferable to prioritize its bilateral BRI and RCEP projects for constructing a China-centered 
“Eurasian trading system”, which could replace the USA as China’s main export market and enable 
state-capitalist economies to become “rule-makers” defending their authoritarian control of economies 
and polities also in transnational cooperation. 
Since China’s first BIT concluded in 1982, China accepted full ICSID jurisdiction since 1998 and pre-
establishment national treatment commitments since 2013 (subject to exceptions). China concluded 
more than 50 BITs with BRI partner countries; but the number of FTAs concluded by China remains 
much smaller (cf. Jingxia 2018). China’s new foreign investment legislation approved in 2019 reflects 
 
13 Due to the illegal “blockage” by the USA of the appointment of AB members since 2017, there was only one single AB 
member left as of 11 December 2019; this rendered the AB uncapable of admitting new appeals, and prompted both the 
USA and other WTO members to prevent adoption of adverse panel reports by “appealing into the void”; cf. 
E.U.Petersmann (2020c). At an informal WTO ministerial meeting during the Davos World Economic Forum in January 
2020, the EU and 16 other WTO members (including China) agreed to using voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 25 
DSU as a temporary substitute for appellate review until the WTO AB would become operational again. In the meeting of 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on 27 January 2020, the USA blocked, once again, Mexico’s request – on behalf of 120 
WTO members – to initiate the procedure for appointing the six vacant AB positions. 
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the changing investment policies; yet, it is widely criticized as “a missed opportunity” to stop the 
downward trend, since 2015, of foreign direct investment in China.14 The number of ICSID arbitration 
procedures for settling disputes involving China as a respondent (three cases only by July 2017), or 
introduced by Chinese investors abroad as complainants (five ISAs by July 2017), remains exceptionally 
low (cf. Un Hong & Yoen Lee 2018). China has played a leading role in the adoption of the 2017 
‘Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking’ by the G20. Yet, EU officials criticize China 
for the “snail pace progress” in the many years of negotiations on a China-EU investment agreement 
and for making access of European companies to the Chinese market often conditional on joint ventures 
and technology transfers. The recent EU proposal for a Regulation reviewing FDI by Chinese companies 
(e.g. screening Chinese take-overs of strategic European industries and of critical information 
technologies and infrastructures) reflects the EU’s cautious attitude vis-à-vis Chinese SOEs and Chinese 
geopolitical influence. The advisory opinion by the CJEU of 30 April 2019 on the consistency with EU 
law of the investment court system of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) of 
the EU with Canada sets out clear constitutional limits for future ISA in a China-EU investment 
agreement.15 In view of China’s non-participation in the UNCLOS arbitral proceeding initiated by the 
Philippines against China in 2013 and China’s non-recognition of the arbitral award of 2016 rejecting 
China’s claims to more than 80% of the South China Sea, it remains doubtful whether China will support 
the EU proposals for a multilateral investment court. It remains to be seen how China – in case the US 
assault on the WTO dispute settlement system should adversely affect also other WTO governance 
functions (like the WTO negotiations on electronic commerce, where China’s insistence on protection 
of “cyber sovereignty” and national data storing requirements conflicts with US positions) – will respond 
to the dismantling of the WTO provisions for horizontal and vertical separation of legislative, 
administrative and judicial WTO governance powers and mutual ‘checks and balances’. The US trade 
war against China risks undermining the important role which international law has so far played in 
furthering economic and legal reforms inside China. 
The systemic conflicts between Chinese state-capitalism, Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism and European 
ordo-liberalism embedded into rights-based, multilevel constitutionalism suggest increasing bilateral 
and regional challenges to the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. BRI projects are driven by 
Chinese economic, political and legal interests, for instance in Chinese top-down governance (e.g. 
prioritizing bilateral contractual arrangements exploiting power asymmetries), China’s preference for 
maintaining legal flexibility, and China’s self-interest in becoming a “rule-maker” in new policy fields 
like the cyberspace and patent registration. The EU is currently designing a multilateral counter-strategy, 
for instance insisting on China’s compliance with EU law in carrying out BRI projects inside the EU 
(e.g. respect for EU regulations for public procurement procedures in case of large infra-structure 
projects like the new high speed train connections between Belgrade and Budapest). From the EU 
perspective, BRI related trade and investment disputes may be better settled through WTO and 
investment arbitration than through Chinese court and arbitration proceedings applying Chinese law, 
whose consistency with EU constitutional law guarantees (like individual rights to effective remedies 
and to a fair trial, cf. Article 47 EUCFR) appears doubtful. Currently, 17 EU member states are members 
of the China-led AIIB, and 11 participate in BRI projects, which are discussed in a 17+1 institutional 
framework. Agreement on common EU positions on China’s BRI initiative would be facilitated by 
conclusion of the proposed EU-China investment agreement and by China’s accession to the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement so as to protect reciprocal market access rights, investor rights 
and other fundamental rights and judicial remedies. The breakdown of the WTO dispute settlement 
system risks adversely affecting the impact of WTO law on China’s continuing “rule by law 
 
14 See: “China’s new foreign investment law is a missed opportunity”, Financial Times 24 December 2019. 
15 Opinion 1/2017 CJEU of 30 April 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341. In Opinion 1/2017, the ISA procedures in the CETA were 
found to be consistent with EU law in view of the legal limitations of the potential reach of ISA by CETA guarantees of, 
inter alia, the legal autonomy of EU law, the EU judicial system, the democratic ‘regulatory freedom’ to protect non-
economic PGs, and of fundamental rights (e.g. of access to judicial remedies, equal treatment) as protected in the EUCFR.    
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construction”. The constitutional requirement of the EU under Article 3 of its Lisbon Treaty to contribute 
– also in its external relations – to “the sustainable development of the Earth”, “free and fair trade”, “the 
protection of human rights” and “to the strict observance … of international law” will be closely watched 
by European civil societies and democratic institutions in future EU cooperation with China. Notably in 
the implementation of the EU’s “new green deal” for climate change mitigation through reduction of 
greenhouse gas emission, the EU’s introduction of taxes on carbon-emissions and related “border carbon 
adjustments” are likely to give rise to increasing conflicts with other WTO members (like China, India 
and the USA as the countries with the largest carbon emissions). China’s use of WTO law for promoting 
“rule by law” in China’s multilevel governance of transnational trade reflects a “thin”, formal conception 
of rule of law that does not meet all the formal criteria (like publicity, prospective application, generality, 
clarity, consistency, performability, stability over time, congruity between the positively enacted and 
actually practiced law) and institutional criteria (like an independent judicial system) of what L.Fuller 
called the “internal morality of law” (cf. Fuller 1977, 46 ff). China’s legal system and “rule by law” are 
even less consistent with substantive conceptions of rule of law, notably with the human and 
constitutional rights protected by EU law, by UN human rights and labor rights conventions, or by the 
definition of “rule of law” in UN reports.16 This systemic rivalry between China’s totalitarian state-
capitalism (e.g. using extremely low labor costs and state subsidies for its export-led growth model) and 
Europe’s rights-based “social market economy” (based on multilevel human rights and democratic 
constitutionalism) is likely to remain a source for regular economic conflicts in the cooperation among 
China and Europe, which would be resolved best through multilateral, rules-based legal and dispute 
settlement systems. It remains paradoxical that – even though the WTO remains the only worldwide 
organization capable of negotiating multilateral competition and legal disciplines for SOEs, state 
subsidies and other market distortions – the US Trump administration has given up Western leadership 
for using WTO law and dispute settlement procedures as constraints on systemic, competitive distortions 




16 Cf. Report by the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (UN 
Security Council, 23 August 2004), which defines the rule of law as a “principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, 
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires as well measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, 
legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency”. 
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